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G. GIFTS
Bkais v. Touchet, [1963] S.C.R. 358.
In Blais v. Touchet,' a testator in his will left all his property
to a named bishop "pour ses ouevres, mais pour les ouevres qui
aideraient la cause des Canadiens Frangais dans son diocese."
The bishop claimed no beneficial interest in the property, and
the trial judge decided he took no such beneficial interest. Thus the
only question on appeal was whether this was a valid charitable gift.
If not, the gift would fail, on either of two grounds: that it was of
indefinite duration; or that it was uncertain. Neither ground defeats
an otherwise valid charitable gift.
The Supreme Court of Canada held there was a valid charitable
gift, reversing the decision of the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal and
restoring the judgment of McKercher J., at trial.
The trial judge translated "oeuvre" to mean "charity". He is
quoted by the Court of Appeal 2 as saying:
The will said 'for his charities . .

.'

meaning for the religious respon-

sibilities of the bishop, and went on to say 'but for his charities which
will aid the cause of the French Canadians in his diocese.' This limits
the application of the trust by the bishop to the French Canadians in the
Diocese of Prince Albert

In arriving at his decision that this was a valid charitable gift,
McKercher J. relied on Re Simson 3 where a gift in a will to "the
Vicar of St. Luke's Church, Ramsgate, to be used for his work in
the parish" was held to be a valid charitable gift for the benefit of

the parish.
The Court of Appeal based its approach on a statement in Re

Spensley's Will Trusts4 where Jenkins, L.J. purported to sum up the
law in this area as follows:
Where there is a gift to a person who holds an office the duties of
which are in their nature wholly charitable, and the gift is made to him
in his official name and by virtue of his office, then, if the purposes are
not expressed in the gift itself, the gift is assumed to be for the charitable
purposes inherent in the office.... But where the purposes of a gift are
plainly expressed in terms not confining them to purposes which are in
the legal sense charitable they cannot be confined to charitable purposes
merely by reference to the character of the trustee.

The Court of Appeal translated the bequest as "for his works,
but for such of the works as would aid the cause of French Canadians
in his diocese." The Court said that had the words of the bequest
ended at the phrase "for his works" there would have been strong
argument that the gift was for the charitable purposes inherent in
the office of the bishop. However, said the Court, the added words,
namely, "for such of the works as would aid the cause of French
Canadians in his diocese" are enlarging words, covering purposes
1 (1962) 34 D.L.R. (2d) 521 [Court of Appeal], [1963] S.C.R. 358.
2 (1962) 34 D.L.R. (2d) 521 at p. 522.
3 [1946] 1 Ch. 299.
4 [1954] 1 All E.R. 178 at p. 183.

244

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 3

beyond the ordinary meaning of charity, not limited to ecclesiastical
purposes inherent in the bishop's office. Therefore, said the Court,
there was no valid charitable gift.
The unanimous judgment of five members of the Supreme Court
of Canada was delivered by Judson, J. With regard to determining
the meaning of the added words, he says the testator, an educated
man writing in his mother tongue, must be assumed to know the
meaning of his own words and to know the religious responsibilities
of the bishop.
The learned judge then refers to three French language dictionaries for the meaning of the word "oeuvre", and without translating the definitions in these dictionaries, concludes that with this
"well-recognized" meaning of the word in the French language, and
its use in a will by a French priest who "knew what he was writing
about" the gift was charitable by virtue of the bishop's office, and the
added words in the will did not take the gift out of the charitable
field. He adds that cases in this area depend on the construction of
the particular words used, that the law in this area is over-technical,
and that he is unwilling to make it more so. He says he follows In Re
Garrard,5 Re Flinn6 and Be RumbaZI.7
The above decision may perhaps best be commented upon by a
general glimpse of the murky law relating to charitable gifts to holders
of ecclesiastical office. No attempt is made here to define "charity"
or "charitable purposes" in the legal sense.
A convenient starting point is the statement in Re Spensley's
Will Trustss quoted by the Court of Appeal in the present case. The
first part of this statement was that
Where there is a gift to a person who holds an office the duties of which

are in their nature wholly charitable, and the gifts made to him in his
official name and by virtue of his office, then, if the purposes are not
expressed in the gift itself, the gift is assumed to be for the charitable
purposes inherent in the office.

It would seem that the offices of vicar, churchwarden, bishop,
archbishop and the like are such offices. At any rate the cases accept
that a gift to vicars and churchwardens etc. simpliciter (without
more) is a valid charitable gift for ecclesiastical purposes in the
office. See, for example, Be Garrard.
Exactly why this should be so is not clear, for as pointed out
in Re Simso 9 besides his ecclesiastical functions, a vicar undertakes
various activities that are merely benevolent and not charitable in
the legal sense.
5

[19071 1 Ch.382.

6 [1948] 1 All E.R. 541.

[19561 1 Ch.105.
Supra, footnote 4 at p. 183.
9 [19461 1 Ch.299.
7

8
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The second part of the Spens7ey analysis is that
But where the purposes of a gift are plainly expressed in terms not confining them to purposes which are in the legal sense charitable they
cannot be confined to charitable purposes merely by reference to the
character of the trustee.

This statement springs from Dunne v. Byrne' o where Lord McNaghten said he found it difficult to see how a trust expressed "in
plain language" could be limited or modified in scope by reference to

the position or character of the trustee. Commenting on this statement in Re Ashton's Estate," Sir Wilfred Greene, M.R., said Lord
McNaghten's remarks were directed to trusts expressed in plain
language and that Lord McNaghten
did not mean to suggest that the character of the trustee is a thing
which is to be disregarded in construing the gift as a whole. I can well
conceive of cases where the purpose named takes its colour from the
character of the trustee....

Leaving theory for practice, we turn to some of the decisions
of the courts. It is to be noted that in all these cases the holder of
the ecclesiastical office is regarded as taking no beneficial interest,
and the only question is the effect of any additional words in the gift.
In Re Garrard,'2 a gift to the vicar and churchwardens for the
time being of a certain parish "to be applied by them in such manner
as they shall in their sole discretion think fit" was held to be a valid
charitable gift. Jenkins, J. said that the quoted words merely left it
up to the trustee to settle the particular mode of application of the
gift within the charitable purposes of the legacy.
In Dunne v. Byrne1 3 the Court said a bequest to "the Roman

Catholic Archbishop of Brisbane and his successors to be used and
expended wholly or in part as such Archbishop may judge most
conducive to the good of religion in this diocese" was held not a good
charitable bequest. The words used were not the equivalent of the
expression "for religious purposes"; something may be conducive to
the good of religion in a particular diocese or district without being
charitable in the legal sense.
In Re Bain'4 there was a bequest to the vicar of St. Alban's
Church, Holborn, "for such objects connected with the church as he
shall think fit." It was held that the quoted words meant the discretion exercised by the vicar must be within church, and not parochial,
purposes. The gift was a valid charitable gift.
In e Davies,'5 the gift was "to the archbishop for the time
being of the Archdiocese of Cardiff for work connected with the
10 [19123 A.C. 407.
11 [1938] 1 All E.R. 707 at p. 710.
12 [19073 1 Ch.382.
13 SUpra, footnote 10.
'4 [1930] 1 Ch.224.

15 (1932) 48 T.L.R. 539, affd. 49 T.L.R. 5.
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Roman Catholic Church in the said archdiocese." The gift was held
not to be charitable because the words quoted would cover many pious,
philanthropic or benevolent purposes not charitable in the legal sense.
The words "connected with" enlarge the purposes beyond the ordinary
work of the Roman Catholic church.
In Farley v. Westminster Bank,16 the gift was to "the vicar and
churchwardens of St. Columba's Church, Hoxton (for parish work)
" This was held not to be a valid charitable gift. Lord Atkin
said the words "parish work" were so vague as to go far beyond the
meaning of charity, used in the sense of being for a religious purpose.
He says the expression covers all the ordinary activities of the parish,
some of which are for religious purposes, and some not. The fact that
an activity is conducive to the moral and spiritual good of the vicar's
congregation is not enough to bring it within the legal meaning of
charitable.
In Be Simson,17 the gift to the vicar "to be used for his work in
the parish" was held to be a valid charitable gift. The Court said the
issue was the effect of the quoted words. If they did not enlarge
what went before, or if they narrow it, this would be a valid charitable
gift. It was held that the words "for his work" did not enlarge what
went before, and the words "in the parish" are limiting, i.e. preclude
work outside the parish, such as foreign mission work.
In Re Eastes,'8 the gift was to the vicar and churchwarden for
the time being of a certain area "for any purposes in connection with
the said church which they may select it being my wish that they
shall especially bear in mind the requirements of the children in the
said parish of St. George's Church and I declare that in no circumstances shall they.., use any portion of the said moneys in connection
with the furtherance of overseas missions." It was held to be a valid
charitable gift. The words "in connection with" did not import something wider than the strictly religious purposes of the church; neither
did the words relating to the children-this was just a request that
the children be specially kept in mind. The reference to the parish
was only a geographical expression denoting the children, who being
in the parish, would normally go to the parish church. Thus the words
did not import parochial work as distinct from the religious purposes
of the church.
In e Flinn,19 the gift was to an archbishop "for such purposes
as he shall in his absolute discretion think fit." It was held a valid
charitable gift. After holding that the archbishop did not take beneficially, the Court said that to give a wholly unrestricted meaning to
the words would not be consistent with such holding because it would
indicate a beneficial interest was taken, and so the words were con16 [19391 A.C. 430.
17 Supra, footnote 3.
18 [19481 1 All E.R. 536.
19 Supra, footnote 6.

19641

Supreme Court Review

strued to mean absolute discretion within the charitable purposes inherent in his office.
In Re RurnbaZ20 the gift was to "the Bishop for the time being of
the diocese of the Windward Islands to be used by him as he thinks
fit in his diocese." This was held to be a valid charitable gift. The

bishop was to take by virtue of his office and got no beneficial interest,
and the words following the description of him were limited by the
charitable character of his office. Evershed, M.R., approved the argument of counsel for the bishop and said:2 1
The question is, upon the construction of the language used, whether the
words following the gift are intended merely to indicate that, within the
scope of the trusts properly appropriate to the nature of the office by
which the donee is described, the discretion is entirely the donee's; or
whether, by the added words, the donor is himself intending to state, or
at least to indicate, the trusts upon which the donee is to hold the
property. If the latter is the true interpretation then the further question
of construction arises whether the trusts so indicated or stated comprehend non-charitable objects. But where the words following the gift to
the donee are absolutely general, ....
the right inference to be drawn...

is, that the words are intended merely to indicate that, within the scope
of the trusts already implicit in the gift, the discretion is the donees; for
otherwise the added words would permit beneficial enjoyment by the
donee of the fund disposed of.

A further requirement for validity of charitable gifts except
those for the relief of poverty is that the gift must be for the benefit
of the community or an appreciably important class of the community.
The inhabitants satisfy this requirement, but private individuals or
22
a fluctuating body thereof, do not: Verge v. Sommerville.
In Oppenheim v. Tobacco Securities,z the House of Lords said
the words "section of the community" indicates that the possible
beneficiaries must not be numerically negligible, and that the quality
that distinguishes them from other members of the community so
that they form by themselves a section of it, must be a quality which
does not depend on their relation to a particular individual. Re Cox,24
where the relationship was common employer, is an example.
The decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Blais v. Touchet,25 although not a helpful case, at least does not confuse this area
of the law to any greater extent than before. In the end the case may
probably be justified solely on the basis of translating "ouevres" to
mean charities. In Chichester Diocesan Fund v. Simpson26 at p. 356
Lord Wright said:
The Court of Chancery . . . have adopted 'charity' or 'charitable' as a
sufficient general description in cases where testators have left bequests
to such charitable objects as their executors may select.
Supra, footnote 7.
Ibid., atp .115.
22 [1924] A.C. 496 at p. 499.
23
[1951] 1 All E.R. 31.
25
20
2

Supra, footnote 1.

26

[1944] A.C. 341.
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And at p. 368 Lord Simonds said:
[the word] 'charitable' . . . is a term of art with a technical meaning

and that is the meaning which the testator must be assumed to have
intended.

On this basis the bequest is a valid charitable gift once translated
as it was by the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal. The only
other hurdle and, it would seem, one easily cleared, is the Verge v.
Sommerville27 requirement. However, it would seem clear that French
Canadians of a diocese would be a "section of the community."

D.S.F.
H. INSURANCE
Dominion Bridge Company Ltd. & Toronto General Insurance Company, [1963] S.C.R. 326.
A short history of this action will suffice to explain its presence
in the Supreme Court. The trial decision holding the present respondent, Toronto General Insurance Co. liable on a contract of insurance
was reversed in the British Columbia Court of Appeal1 and the appellant, Dominion Bridge Co. Ltd., sought to have the original decision restored.
The facts presented no difficulty and may be summarily stated.
The appellant entered into a contract with a Toll Bridge Authority to
erect the steel superstructure of a bridge and for their own protection
took out a "Contractor's Public Liability Policy" with the respondent.
The relevant provision of this policy was Endorsement No. 1 by
which the respondent undertook:
A. To pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall become obligated to pay by reason of the liability imposed upon Insured
by law for damages because of injury to or destruction of property,
caused by accident occurring within the Policy Period ... and resulting
from or while at or about work or operations of the insured ....

Then followed the Exclusions Clause which read:
This Endorsement shall have no application with respect to and shall

not extend to nor cover any claim arising or existing by reason of any
of the following matters:
(W) Liability or obligation assumed by Insured under any contract or
agreement.
(2) ...

A portion of the bridge collapsed causing considerable damage to
piers which had been erected by the Authority. It was found as a
fact that (1) the appellant had assumed liability in contract for the
damage, and (2) that the appellant was also, by reason of its engineer's
negligence, liable in tort. Dominion sought indemnity from General
but coverage was denied by reason of the exclusionary clause. Dominion argued that the liabilities were distinct and although the exclusion
27

Supra,footnote 22 at p. 499.
1 (1962) 37 W.W.R. 673 reversing (1961) 34 W.W.R. 289.

